Rapid 7 - State-Sponsored Threat Actors Target Security Researchers
This blog was co-authored by Caitlin Condon, VRM Security Research Manager, and Bob Rudis, Senior Director and Chief Security Data Scientist.
On Monday, Jan. 25, 2021, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published a blog on a widespread social engineering campaign that targeted security researchers working on vulnerability research and development. The campaign, which Google attributed to North Korean (DPRK) state-sponsored actors, has been active for several months and sought to compromise researchers using several methods.
Rapid7 is aware that many security researchers were targeted in this campaign, and information is still developing. While we currently have no evidence that we were compromised, we are continuing to investigate logs and examine our systems for any of the IOCs listed in Google’s analysis. We will update this post with further information as it becomes available.
Organizations should take note that this was a highly sophisticated attack that was important enough to those who orchestrated it for them to burn an as-yet unknown exploit path on. This event is the latest in a chain of attacks—e.g., those targeting SonicWall, VMware, Mimecast, Malwarebytes, Microsoft, Crowdstrike, and SolarWinds—that demonstrates a significant increase in threat activity targeting cybersecurity firms with legitimately sophisticated campaigns. Scenarios like these should become standard components of tabletop exercises and active defense plans.
North Korean-attributed social engineering campaign
Google discovered that the DPRK threat actors had built credibility by establishing a vulnerability research blog and several Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets. They published videos of their alleged exploits, including a YouTube video of a fake proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2021-1647—a high-profile Windows Defender zero-day vulnerability that garnered attention from both security researchers and the media. The DPRK actors also published “guest” research (likely plagiarized from other researchers) on their blog to further build their reputation.
The malicious actors then used two methods to social engineer targets into accepting malware or visiting a malicious website. According to Google:
- After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project. Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional pre-compiled library (DLL) that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events. The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled command and control (C2) domains.
- In addition to targeting users via social engineering, Google also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog. In each of these cases, the researchers followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on
blog[.]br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server. At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions. As of Jan. 26, 2021, Google was unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise.
The blog the DPRK threat actors used to execute this zero-day drive-by attack was posted on Reddit as long as three months ago. The actors also used a range of social media and communications platforms to interact with targets—including Telegram, Keybase, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Discord. As of Jan. 26, 2021, many of these profiles have been suspended or deactivated.
Rapid7 customers
Google’s threat intelligence includes information on IOCs, command-and-control domains, actor-controlled social media accounts, and compromised domains used as part of the campaign. Rapid7's MDR team is deploying IOCs and behavior-based detections. These detections will also be available to InsightIDR customers later today. We will update this blog post with further information as it becomes available.
Defender guidance
TAG noted in their blog post that they have so far only seen actors targeting Windows systems. As of the evening of Jan. 25, 2021, researchers across many companies confirmed on Twitter that they had interacted with the DPRK actors and/or visited the malicious blog. Organizations that believe their researchers or other employees may have been targeted should conduct internal investigations to determine whether indicators of compromise are present on their networks.
At a minimum, responders should:
- Ensure members of all security teams are aware of this campaign and encourage individuals to report if they believe they were targeted by these actors.
- Search web traffic, firewall, and DNS logs for evidence of contacts to the domains and URLs provided by Google in their post.
- According to Rapid7 Labs’ forward DNS archive, the
br0vvnn[.]ioapex domain has had two discovered fully qualified domain names (FQDNs)—api[.]br0vvnn[.]ioandblog[.]br0vvnn[.]io—over the past four months with IP addresses192[.]169[.]6[.]31and192[.]52[.]167[.]169, respectively. Contacts to those IPs should also be investigated in historical access records. - Check for evidence of the provided hashes on all systems, starting with those operated and accessed by members of security teams.
Moving forward, organizations and individuals should heed Google’s advice that “if you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.”
from Rapid7 Blog https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/01/26/state-sponsored-threat-actors-target-security-researchers/
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